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10  On “negative capability”, see Robert Kaufman, 
“Negatively capable dialectics: Keats, Vend-
ler, Adorno, and the theory of the avant-gar-
de”, Critical Inquiry 27/2 (2001): 354–384. For 
a positive evaluation of the internal contradic-
tions of Marxism, see Alvin W. Gouldner, The 
Two Marxisms: Contradictions and Anoma-
lies in the Development of Theory, London, 
Macmillan, 1980 [especially Appendix 3 on 
social “contradictions”, 168–173].
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Disarmament within the framework of the 
League of Nations originated from the percep-
tion of the first world war as a byproduct of the 
massive armaments undertaken by the Great 
Powers prior to its outbreak in the summer 
of 1914. The negotiation on disarmament was 
also linked to another aspect of the league’s 
mission, the construction of a collective secu-
rity framework which would supplant the tradi-
tional balance of power politics and calculations.
Manolis Koumas’ book on Greece’s policy to-
wards the League of Nations’ negotiations on 
disarmament in the interwar years is an origi-
nal and interesting work covering a topic that 
has escaped the attention of Greek historiog-
raphy. It is a well-researched book, with the 
author having consulted a wide array of un-
published and published archival sources – 
Greek, British, French and American – and, si-
multaneously, having acquainted himself with 
the international literature on the subject.
It is true, and Koumas does not pretend other-
wise, that this issue was not necessarily cen-
tral to the formulation of Greek foreign poli-
cy after the Lausanne treaty. Very early on, 
after the brief occupation of Corfu by the Ital-
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ians in 1923, Athens was disillusioned with the 
league’s ability or willingness to impose a sort 
of conformity to international law when this 
was breached by a Great Power. Greece had to 
employ traditional balance-of-power policies, 
either in the regional or European context, so 
that it could secure a measure of security and 
territorial integrity, which was Athens’ pre-
dominant goal after the defeat in Asia Minor in 
1922. This policy, followed in a somewhat ir-
regular manner by Greek governments, from 
1923 to 1928, with the exception of the Pan-
galos administration, was perfected by Ven-
izelos in 1928–30. Realpolitik, not ideology, in 
which Athens calculated its interest alone and 
refrained from binding relationships, was the 
cornerstone of this policy. Venizelos succeed-
ed in balancing the power of Yugoslavia, Mus-
solini’s Italy and, simultaneously, normalising 
Greece’s relations with Turkey. Still, Athens 
could not remain indifferent to the league’s 
disarmament process. Absence itself would 
be tantamount to isolation. Moreover, as Kou-
mas clearly points out, Greece, being in a dire 
financial situation as a result of the need to re-
habilitate Asia Minor refugees, could not dis-
regard a possible settlement that would al-
leviate the armaments burden. Furthermore, 
Greek policy always had to consider the revi-
sionist aspirations of Bulgaria, which sought 
to secure an outlet to the Aegean. Last but not 
least, a nightmare haunted Greek policymak-
ers in the form of a Yugoslav–Bulgarian rap-
prochement that would make the geopolitical 
pressure from the north unbearable. A collec-
tive security arrangement and disarmament 
was one way of neutralising this scenario.
The negotiations, which lasted from 1919 to 
1934, were marked by the differing policy per-
ceptions of Britain and France, the two main 
protagonists in the process. The former tend-
ed to perceive disarmament as a requirement 
for security while the latter’s strategic think-
ing, conversely, tended to favour the establish-
ment of a collective security framework that 
would be complemented by disarmament. In 
the French concept, the league had to define 
what constituted aggression, determine the 
measures that would be employed to counter 
it and, then, impose limits on various catego-
ries of armaments.
Koumas makes plain that, in this context of 
Anglo–French differences, Greek policymak-
ers felt that they had a clear interest in siding 
with the French proposals: the establishment 
of a collective security framework coupled 
with disarmament seemed to offer compre-
hensive cover for Greece’s security problems, 
although the image of an unreliable League 
of Nations always loomed large in the minds 
of Greek officials. Apart from a few occasions 
when it sided with Britain, Athens retained this 
line of support for the French logic of disar-
mament as a corollary to a collective securi-
ty framework. Its aberrations were not based 
necessarily on the intrinsic value of British pro-
posals but on the need of a small coastal state 
not to alienate the preponderant naval power 
in the Mediterranean. 
The negotiations took a turn for the worse, 
in fact they entered their terminal phase, in 
1933–34. Hitler’s rise to power and the ina-
bility of war-weary and crisis-burdened Brit-
ain and France to reach a common position 
led the process to an inescapable end, with-
out an agreement in place. Greece had already 
reorientated its policy of noncommitment to 
alliances towards the conclusion of a Balkan 
pact, along with Yugoslavia, Romania and Tur-
key, in an effort to counter Bulgarian revision-
ism. This pact tied Greece to the wider nexus 
of France’s European alliances, to the conster-
nation of Venizelos, now in opposition, who op-
posed it bitterly. Koumas rightly argues that 
the change in Greek policy was not dictated 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 11/01/2020 00:42:51 |
135
HISTOREIN VO
L
U
M
E
 14.1 (2014)
by the failure of the negotiations on disarma-
ment but by Greek apprehension, which was 
not necessarily founded on hard facts, about a 
potential Yugoslav–Bulgarian rapprochement. 
Still, there was an additional factor that pushed 
the anti-Venizelist government towards the 
conclusion of the pact – the changing dynam-
ics of the national schism. Since 1922, Venize-
los operated on the assumption that the end 
of the Megali Idea (Great Idea) as a policy per-
mitted Greece to pursue a policy of noncom-
mitment to alliances. In the mid-1930s, he 
was convinced that this policy was both de-
sirable and feasible, despite the worsening in-
ternational situation and the possibility of the 
re-emergence of blocs. His opponents, who 
won the March 1933 election, operated on as-
sumptions that derived their validity from the 
first world war: Greece would not be able to 
follow a policy that contradicted the policy pref-
erences of the dominant Mediterranean naval 
power. King Constantine’s failure in May 1917 
to continue a policy of Greek neutrality in the 
face of British and French opposition loomed 
large in anti-Venizelist memory and facilitat-
ed the undertaking of a policy of commitment 
to the Balkan pact. Venizelos’ opposition to its 
conclusion served as a factor that crystallised 
these diverging assumptions and connected 
this disagreement over foreign policy to inter-
nal political dynamics. 
All in all, it can be said that Greek foreign policy 
was not determined exclusively from the “forc-
es profondes” or the ideological preferences of 
distinguished politicians, diplomats and mili-
tary men who were in positions of influence. 
Missing from Koumas’ analysis of the overall 
framework of Greek foreign policy in the con-
cluding chapter of his otherwise interesting 
and important book is the domestic political 
factor, which would permits us to fully grasp 
Greek policymaking.
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The reign of Queen Olga Konstantinovna of 
Greece (1867–1913) represents a landmark 
in the history of Russian–Greek relations. 
The founder of hospitals and schools, the pa-
troness of prison reform and social welfare, 
Queen Olga was a resilient woman who made 
a strong impression on her people. A zealous 
letter writer, Olga bequeathed scholars with an 
abundance of materials that illuminate her pri-
vate and public life during one of the most tur-
bulent 50 years in European history. Disdainful 
of parliamentary politics as “filthy squabbling”, 
her adept manoeuvring through the web of 
European dynastic relations brought benefits 
to her native and adopted homelands, and her 
integrity proved inspirational, especially during 
wartime. A genuinely popular figure (above all 
among soldiers and sailors), historians have 
neglected her story until now.1
O.V. Sokolovskaia, a doctor of history and 
member of the Institute of Slavic Studies in 
the Russian Academy of Sciences, has synthe-
sised hundreds of letters from Olga’s personal 
collection in the State Archive of the Russian 
Federation (GARF) into a sympathetic portrait 
of the queen and her age. Consisting of a pro-
logue, ten short chapters, and an epilogue, 
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